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Abstract: This article discusses the place of God in the poetic system of Aleksandr Vvedensky.
Vvedensky’s famous pronouncement on his “poetic critique” is more throughgoing than Kant’s
critical enterprise, and invites a comparison between the movement of Kant’s thought in the Critique
of Judgment, and what Vvedensky’s recourse to senselessness aims to achieve. Time in Vvedensky
poetics may be seen as a radical extension of Kant’s philosophical system where it ultimately resides
in an equally inaccessible realm on which its entire edifice is founded.
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The poet is a cocoon that unwinds itself in our reading, and this cocoon unwinds
into an endless thread that doesn’t lead anyone anywhere, whether it flashes
or disappears into darkness,–not because it doesn’t know the beginning, but
because as we try to “walk along, or follow” this thread, we will never have
enough time which in its tireless becoming an enveloping “cobweb” draws its
own experience from nothing and only then from “before”.
“Mesh”. (Dragomoshchenko 2011)
Aleksandr Vvedensky, arguably the most outstanding poet of the late pre-war Soviet avant-
garde and a key member of the Chinar-OBERIU group of poets and philosophers, has
been the focus of notable critical attention in the last two decades, most recently after the
publication of the definitive complete edition of his surviving oeuvre.1 He is a very difficult
poet to tackle critically. As Keti Chukhrov points out, “his work not only surpasses all
interpretations and analytical observations, but has the capacity to cancel their significance
and explanatory pathos. This happens because Vvedensky’s writings already contain
within themselves those meta-positions with which one could approach them, including
philosophical, theological, and strangely enough, political ones” (Chukhrov 2011, p. 145).
This could be part of the reason why to date there has been little effort to identify the place
of God in his works. According Vvedensky’s most often cited statement, the poet was
interested only in three things–time, death, and God (Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 167).
Equally famous is his overarching desire to overstep reason, undertaking what he called “a
poetic critique of reason—a more substantial one than that other, abstract critique”,2 the
latter being of course Kant’s First, Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant, a one-time Russian subject and member of St Petersburg Academy of Science,
was most certainly a visible influence on the development of the Russian philosophical and
religious-philosophical thought. It was not until the late 19th century that an explosion of
interest in his work occurred in the Russian academia—owing to the influence of European
neo-Kantianism (with one of the most important Russian philosophers of this school being,
curiously, a different Aleksandr Ivanovich Vvedensky (1856–1925), the poet’s complete
namesake who as professor of St Petersburg University taught, among others, influential
figures as Nikolai Lossky, Petr Struve, and Mikhail Bakhtin). Overall, much as the Russian
philosophers were interested in Kant, they were also critical of him. According to Semyon
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Frank, “critique of Kant’s philosophy and struggle against Kantianism are . . . a constant
theme in the Russian philosophical thought” (Zenkovsky 1999, vol. 1, p. 347). Most
Russian philosophers incorporated Eastern Orthodox beliefs into their systems which were
often more than tinged with irrationality. Like Kant, they recognized the limitations of
human reason, but they also allowed for mystical experiences and intuitions that could give
access to what in Kant is inaccessible, i.e., the realm of the noumena. It is the privileging
of ontology that stopped Russian philosophy from developing its own branch of Kantian
thought. According to another prominent Russian philosopher Aleksei Losev, the cognition
of the hidden realm can only be achieved in a symbol, an image, through the power of
imagination and “inner living agility” (Losev 1991, p. 213).
This postulate was key to the work of Russian symbolists, especially Andrei Bely who
was the only one among them to have studied Kant. In their endeavours, they actively
worked against what they perceived to be purely rational spirit of Kantian philosophy.
“True symbolism”, writes Belyi in an early article “Krititsizm i simvolizm” (“Criticism and
Symbolism”) (written in 1904 on the centennial of Kant’s death), “begins only beyond the
gates of criticism. Symbolism born of criticism, unlike the latter, becomes a living method
that equally differs from dogmatic empiricism and abstract criticism by overcoming them
both” (Bely 1910, p. 29). He argues that the difference Symbolism makes lies in its ability
to overcome the “purely scientific” character of knowledge in Kant and ultimately bridge
the schism between phenomena and noumena—this “Scylla and Charibdis of the Kantian
philosophy” (ibid., p. 25)—by means of creative, intuitive cognition: “The cognition of
ideas reveals in temporal phenomena their timelessly eternal meaning. This cognition joins
together understanding and feeling into something different from them both, something
that covers them both” (ibid., p. 29). Bely’s younger colleagues who, as said, hardly read
any Kant at all, saw him as a Prussian prisoner, a sinister spider whose web of rigid logic
and concepts unfairly limits the freedom of poetic genius, barring it any access to the
noumenal world. To paraphrase the poet Marina Tsvetaeva, “бить Кaнтa нaгoлoву” (“rout
Kant, beat Kant hollow”) becomes a mission for many figures of Russian modernism who
in their quest for a new poetic language think of Kant at best as a powerful enemy (and at
worst, a beating boy).
The Oberiu poets were no exception in this respect. As Iakov Druskin, Vvedensky’s
devoted friend, colleague and astute interpreter testifies, neither Vvedensky, nor his close
associate Daniil Kharms whose work has garnered a much greater critical response were
particularly well-steeped in philosophy. And yet Kharms famously scribbled “against Kant”
underneath his “Blue Notebook no. 10”, prompting future scholars to speculate on the
anti-Kantian drive of the Chinar-Oberiu ideas.3 Druskin (he along with Leonid Lipavsky
were the only real philosophers in the group) once remarked that even though Daniil
Ivanovich may have dropped a quote from Kant, he never really read the philosopher’s
works.4 Meanwhile, Druskin himself held Kant in the highest esteem and in his diaries
listed the philosopher alongside Bach and Vvedensky among the greatest geniuses of
humankind (Druskin 1999, p. 433–34). Moreover, to philosopher Druskin who considered
Vvedensky greatest Russian poet of all times, Kant and Vvedensky share not only greatness
but also a certain universality. Kant’s task was to “abolish knowledge to make room for
faith” (Kant 1993, p. 21); Vvedensky’s “poetic critique of reason” in search of answers to
the questions of time, death, and God pursued the very same objective. Yet, neither was
Kant a religious philosopher, nor Vvedensky a religious poet. Both their projects were
thoroughly critical, even if Vvedensky’s was more thoroughgoing than Kant’s in that it
turned its critique to language.
In what follows, I would like to comment on several crucial passages from Vveden-
sky’s Grey Notebook where the poet is at his most revealing on the subject of time, death, and
God (1932–1933). I hope to demonstrate that instead of “anti-Kantian”, Vvedensky’s poetics
should be described as “ultra-Kantian”. Although he collapses the edifice of Kantian ratio-
nality by blowing up its structural supports, he does so in order to show us that rationality
and a rationality share the same bottomless foundation that cannot be removed. According
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to Kant, “unconditioned necessity, which as the ultimate support of all existing things is
an indispensable requirement, is an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles
in dismay” (Kant 1987, p. 418). Vvedensky’s celebrated line is an eloquent affirmation of
this thesis: “гoрит бессмыслицы звездa, oнa oднa без днa” (“the star if senselessness is
shining, it alone has no bottom”).
This is how Druskin describes the poetic bessmyslitsa of Kharms and Vvedensky in his
essay “Chinari”:
“Works of Vvedensky and Kharms are linked by “the star of senselessness”:
The star of senselessness is shining,
It alone has no bottom”
writes Vvedensky in the epilogue to his large [. . . ] dramatic poem “God is Perhaps All
Around”. I distinguish semantic senselessness which distorts rules of so-called “normal”
speech from situational senselessness which follows from a logical nature of human relation-
ships and situations. Vvedensky has not only situational senselessness, but also semantic,
while Kharms uses mostly that of the situational kind. (Druskin 2000, vol. 1, p. 60).
In another essay on chinari, “Stages of Understanding”, Druskin says the following
with regard to senselessness in the work of Vvedensky:
One has to understand Vvedensky’s senselessness, the logic of alogicality. By
itself, this word combination is senseless, for alogical is that which is not logical.
Senslessness is that which has no sense, is incomprehensible. Fichte once said: we
need to understand the incomprehensible as incomprehensible. Vvedensky would
have said: we need not to understand the incomprehensible as incomprehensible.
This is what he did say: to truly understand is not to understand. Still, alogicality
has its own logic, alogical logic. But this logic would always be alogical to our reason
fallen in Adam—not relatively, but absolutely alogical, docta ignorantia (Nicholas of
Cusa), madness for reason. (Druskin 2000, vol. 1, p. 420f)
That Druskin brings up Nicholas of Cusa here is supremely significant. The German
philosopher’s doctrine of learned ignorance states precisely this: “Since the unqualifiedly
and absolutely Maximum (than which there cannot be greater) is greater than we can
comprehend (because it is Infinite Truth), we attain unto it in no other way than incom-
prehensibly. For since it is not of the nature of those things which can be comparatively
greater and lesser, it is beyond all that we can conceive” (Nicholas of Cusa 1981, p. 8).
When Druskin brings up Cusanus’ concept of Divine madness, it is in the context of an
absolute break between human logic and the alogical Logos. According to Druskin, as
we have no logical means of passing from human wisdom to Divine madness, we must
conduct this passage (“perekhod”) “in leaps” (“skachkami”): “Each of us makes it daily,
without realising that it is alogical. The poet, the philosopher make it consciously” (ibid.,
p. 421). From this he concludes that most often people make mistakes when they follow the
logic of correct reasoning, and vice versa: “erroneous, alogical reasoning is correct” (ibid.).
To Vvedensky, in the relationship between poetry and life what matters is the “cor-
rectness of the verse line”, “прaвильнoсть стихa”. As he explicitly states, “it is incorrect
to discuss art in terms of beautiful/not beautiful. Art should be discussed in terms of
correct/incorrect” (as per Druskin 1993, vol. 2, p. 167). In Kant’s third Critique the feeling
of the beautiful is seen as arising out of the play of the understanding and the imagination,
and it only concerns the finite forms of phenomena: It concentrates on the capacity of
transcendental imagination to present a form that accords with its free play. At issue in the
Analytic of the Beautiful is the existence of an accord between the sensible manifold and a
certain pre-conceptual unity of the supersensible (Kant 1987, p. 15). The kind of art that
Vvedensky proposes is not about the imagination and its play, but rather about what Kant
discusses in the Analytic of the Sublime, which turns to the realm of infinite Ideas, and this
is where we are indeed faced with the notion of passage. The sublime enters at a crucial
point in the Third Critique where the philosopher is in search of a passage, an Übergang, be-
tween the theoretical and the practical realms and to do violence to imagination as sensorily
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determined by clashing it with reason’s supersensory demands. The sublime is a powerful
reminder of the fact that the a priori principle, which grounds reflective judgment cannot
cover up the abyss separating the worlds of nature (phenomena) and freedom (noumena).
Although, the reconciliation of the two is promised in the sphere of the beautiful. In its
violence, the sublime also involves a presentation, albeit a negative one, of imagination’s
inability to present ideas of reason. As imagination strives to progress toward infinity,
“reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [imagination]... is inadequate to
that idea” (Kant 1987, p. 106). Yet, with the spontaneous arousal of the feeling “that we
have within us a supersensible power”, reason forces the mind to an invariably doomed
effort to make a presentation of the senses adequate to the totality.
While the beautiful “concerns the form of the object”, i.e., limitation, the sublime
strives for the unlimited as it seizes us in the presence of “a formless object insofar as we
present unboundedness” (Kant 1987, p. 98). The beautiful “concerns the form of the object,
that is its limitation”, whereas the feeling of the sublime seizes us in the presence “of a
formless object to the extent that the unlimited here represents itself” (Kant 1987, p. 99).
The feeling of a lack of limits that the sublime brings with itself is about disorder and a
return to the chaos, which the transcendental imagination orders by imposing form. It is
in this sense that Vvedensky’s art directly speaks to the ideas of reason which it of course
cannot represent, but at which it continuously gestures through a critique of language
whose “poverty” it exhibits as a means to discredit completely our rational knowledge, the
ego-centric self and its spatio-temporal reality as expressed in language.5 Let us once again
ponder Vvedensky’s most important poetic pronouncement in Lipavsky’s Conversations
where the poet draws the often-cited comparison between Kant’s and his own critiques:
Мoжнo ли нa этo [прoблему времени] oтветить искусствoм? Увы, oнo субъек-
тивнo. Πoэзия прoизвoдит тoлькo слoвеснoе чудo, a не нaстoящее. Дa и кaк
рекoнструирoвaть мир, неизвестнo. Я пoсягнул нa пoнятия, нa исхoдныеoбoбщения,
чтo дo меня никтo не делaл. Этим я прoвел кaк бы пoэтическую критику рaзумa–
бoлееoснoвaтельную, чем тa, oтвлеченнaя. Я усумнился, чтo, нaпример, дoм,
дaчa и бaшня связывaются иoбъединяются пoнятием здaние. Мoжет быть, плечo
нaдo связывaть с четыре. Я делaл этo нa прaктике, в пoэзии, и тем дoкaзывaл.
И я убедился в лoжнoсти прежних связей, нo не мoгу скaзaть, кaкие дoлжны
быть нoвые. Я дaже не знaю, дoлжнa ли бытьoднa системa связей или их
мнoгo. И у меняoснoвнoеoщущение бессвязнoсти мирa и рaздрoбленнoсти вре-
мени. A тaк кaк этo прoтивoречит рaзуму, тo знaчит рaзум не пoнимaет мирa.
(Vvedensky 2010, p. 593)
Could one respond to this [the problem of time] with art? Alas, art is subjective.
Poetry produces only a verbal miracle, not a real one. Besides, we don’t know
how to reconstruct the world. I infringed upon concepts, primary generalizations,
which no one has done before me. By doing so I conducted a kind of a poetic
critique of reason—a more substantial one than that other, abstract critique. For
example, I put in doubt that “house”, “dacha”, and “tower” must be connected
and joined together by the concept “building”. Maybe “shoulder” must be
connected to “four”. I did it in practice, in poetry, and thus proved it. And I
saw for myself the falseness of previous connections, but I can’t tell you what
new ones should be. I don’t even know whether there should be one system of
connections or whether there are many of them. And I’ve got a general sense that
the world is disjointed and time is fragmented. And since this contradicts reason,
then reason doesn’t understand the world.
This passage sums up Vvedensky’s poetics as a critique of reason which certainly
appears to go against the grain of Kant’s First Critique where the philosopher aims to
explain how synthetic a priori knowledge makes the phenomenal world cohere via concepts
of understanding. However, the First Critique contains within itself those fundamental
theoretical postulates that are at the core of Vvedensky’s poetic practice. In the Critique
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of Pure Reason, synthetic a priori judgments (and hence our knowledge) hinge upon the
idea of time as an a priori non-figurable form of all forms in which “alone all reality of
appearances is possible” (Kant 1993, p. 54). However, according to Kant, it only has
empirical reality insofar as it is a form of our internal intuition: “If we take away from it the
special condition of our sensibility, the concept of time also vanishes; and it inheres not in
the objects themselves, but solely in the subject which intuits them” (Kant 1993, p. 58). Time
also determines the reality of our very selves: just as time without us is nothing, we are
nothing without time. This is precisely what Vvedensky states in Grey Notebook where we
read, “Bремя единственнoе чтo вне нaс не существует. Онo пoглoщaет все существующее
вне нaс. Тут нaступaет нoчь умa. Bремя вoсхoдит нaд нaми кaк звездa” (“Time is the
only thing that doesn’t exist outside us. It consumes all that exists outside us. Here the
night of reason sets in. Time rises above us like a star”). (Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 78).
Here we are once again confronted with the need to make a leap, to cross over from what
Druskin designates “this” and “that” (“eto” and “to”–see Druskin 2000). What Vvedensky
terms “correct” art is the kind that operates within this “night of reason”. In Kant’s first
Critique, understanding, the faculty Vvedensky wants to shut down, is “comprehension
of plurality in unity” in the sense of a unifying intention of imagination that reproduces
past moments, in order to open the horizon of the present, keeping present what passes,
creating, as it were, an illusion of the temporal flux. Vvedensky famously proposes an
experiment that would demonstrate that in what we perceive as linear continuity is, in fact,
a discontinuous succession of apprehension.
Если с чaсoв стереть цифры, если зaбыть лoжные нaзвaния, тo уже мoжет
быть время зaхoчет пoкaзaть нaм свoе тихoе тулoвище, себя вo весь рoст.
Πускaй бегaет мышь пo кaмню. Cчитaй тoлькo кaждый ее шaг. Зaбудь тoлькo
слoвo кaждый, зaбудь тoлькo слoвo шaг. Тoгдa кaждый ее шaг пoкaжется
нoвым движеньем. Πoтoм, тaк кaк у тебя спрaведливo исчезлo вoсприятие
рядa движений кaк чегo-тo целoгo, чтo ты нaзывaлoшибoчнo шaгoм(ты путaл
движенье и время с прoстрaнствoм, ты невернo нaклaдывaл их друг нa
другa), тo движение у тебя нaчнет дрoбиться, oнo придет пoчти к нулю.
Нaчнется мерцaние. Мышь нaчнет мерцaть. Оглянись: мир мерцaет(кaк
мышь). (Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 81)
If we were to erase the numbers from a clock, if we were to forget its false names,
maybe then time would want to show its quiet torso, to appear to us in its full glory. Let
the mouse run over the stone. Count only its every step. Only forget the word every, only
forget the word step. Then each step will seem a new movement. Then, since your ability
to perceive a series of movements as something whole has rightfully disappeared, that
which you wrongly called a step (you had confused movement and time with space, you
falsely transposed one over the other), that movement will begin to break apart, it will
approach zero. The shimmering will begin. The mouse will start to shimmer. Look around
you: The world is shimmering (like a mouse) (Vvedensky 2002, p. 11).
Such non-understanding of time would cancel not only most basic logical connections
but also memory. In order to make the world shimmer, one has to forget every movement
of the mouse before it makes a new one. Some sixty years earlier Friedrich Nietzsche
suggested in his Untimely Meditations that a very similar mode of perception would charac-
terize an animal: “[Man] wonders about himself, that he is not able to learn to forget and
that he always hangs onto past things. No matter how far or how fast he runs, this chain
runs with him [. . . ] Man says, “I remember”, and envies the beast, which immediately
forgets and sees each moment really perish, sink back in cloud and night, and vanish
forever” (Nietzsche 1983, p. 61). Nietzsche thinks the beast is happy for existing purely
in the present even though it cannot communicate this happiness because it immediately
forgets what it wants to say. Vvedensky refrains from such pronouncements although he
too envies the beast (cf. “Мне жaлкo чтo я не зверь . . . ”. “Я с зaвистью гляжу нa зверя...”.
(“I feel sorry I’m not a beast . . . ”, “I look at the beast with envy . . . ”). In the Grey Notebook
he is far more ambivalent about the happiness of animals for he can only observe them from
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within his “glass jar of time”: “Букaшкa думaетo счaстье. Boдянoй жук тoскует. Звери
не упoтребляютaлкoгoля. Звери скучaют без нaркoтических веществ. Они предaются
живoтнoму рaзврaту. Звери время сидит нaд вaми. Bремя думaетo вaс и Бoг. [...] Нo
мыoстaвим в пoкoе лес, мы ничегo не пoймем в лесу”. (Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 82)
“The little bug is thinking about happiness. Water beetle is sad. Animals don’t take alcohol.
Animals are bored without narcotic substances. They give themselves to animal lechery.
Animals time sits above you. Time is thinking about you and god. But let us leave the forest
in peace, we won’t understand anything in the forest” (Vvedensky 2002, p. 15). What we
can do instead is try some of those substances that animals do not take and see whether
we could approximate their condition and cast off the chain of time. The character named
Svidersky’s relates the following story:
Однaжды я шел пo дoрoгеoтрaвленный ядoм,
и время сo мнoю шaгaлo рядoм [. . . ]
Я думaлo тoм, пoчему лишь глaгoлы
пoдвержены чaсу, минуте и гoду,
a дoм, лес и небo, кaк будтo мoнгoлы,
oт времени вдруг пoлучили свoбoду.
Я думaл и пoнял. Мы все этo знaем,
чтo действие стaлo бессoнным китaем,
чтo умерли действия, лежaт мертвецaми,
и мы их теперь укрaшaем венкaми.
Πoдвижнoсть их лoжь, их плoтнoстьoбмaн,
и их неживoй пoглoщaет тумaн [. . . ]
Яoстaнoвился. Я пoдумaл тут,
я не мoгoхвaтить умoм нaшествие всех нoвых бедствий.
И я увидел дoм ныряющий кaк зимa,
и я увидел лaстoчкуoбoзнaчaющую сaд
где тени деревьев кaк ветви шумят,
где ветви деревьев кaк тени умa.
Я услышaл музыкиoднooбрaзную пoхoдку,
я пытaлся пoймaть слoвесную лoдку.
Я испытывaл слoвo нa oгне и стуже,
нo чaсы зaтягивaлись все туже и туже,
И цaрствoвaвший вo мне яд
влaствoвaл кaк пустoй сoн.
Однaжды. (Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 77)
Once upon a time I walked poisoned down a road
And time walked in step by my side. [. . . ]
I thought about why only verbs are
subjugated to the hour, minute, and year,
while house, forest and sky, like the Mongols
have suddenly been released from time.
I thought about it and I understood. We all know it,
that action became an insomniac China,
that actions are dead, they stretch out like dead men,
and now we decorate them with garlands.
Their mobility is a lie, their density a swindle,
and a dead fog devours them. [. . . ]
I stopped. Here I thought,
my mind could not grasp the onslaught of new tribulations.
And I saw a house, like winter, diving.
And I saw a swallow signifying a garden
where the shadows of trees like branches make sound,
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where the branches of trees are like shadows of the mind.
I heard music’s monotonous gait,
I tried to catch the verbal boat.
I tested the word in cold and fire,
but the hours drew in tighter and tighter.
And the poison reigning inside me
wielded power like an empty dream
Once upon a time. (Vvedensky 2002, p. 9)
This poem presents a certain narrative, which Vvedensky discusses in a series of
comments in the remainder of the Grey Notebook. Here, we have a sequential series of
actions, unfolding, strictly speaking, one after another, i.e., as a temporal progression:
“Шел, шaгaлo, думaл, пoнял(walked, thought, understood)—all these are verbs that are
points in a simple sequence of events. Yet, it is the synthesis of unfolding actions into
a single story that Vvedensky sees as the source of our habitual delusion with regard
to time. According to the First Critique, “if I always let the preceding representations
escape from my thought . . . and if I did not reproduce them as I arrive at the following
representations, no complete representations . . . not even the fundamental representations,
not even the most pure and completely primary ones of space and time could be produced”
(Kant 1993, pp. 114–15, 133). This is indeed the death of actions, and a slipping of the
world into a senseless chaos—precisely the kind of thing that we witness in Svidersky’s
monologue. The corpses of verbs unleash an attack of “new tribulations”, that are no longer
connected with one another, or with anything else for that matter, and that proliferate ad
infinitum once the synthesis has stopped. The mind can no longer grasp what is occurring,
and the scenario is very much that which Kant describes in the Analytic of the Sublime
where imagination falters, leaving us with a negative presentation of the effort to represent
infinite ideas of reason, in this case, time itself.
The moment of failure is marked not only in the actual narrative but also in the
rhythmical pattern of the poem: ‘Яoстaнoвился. Я пoдумaл тут,/я не мoгoхвaтить умoм
нaшествие всех нoвых бедствий”. This is the locus classicus of Hölderlin’s caesura which
the German poet famously defines in his Annotations to Oedipus as “the pure word, the
counter-rhythmic rupture” necessary, “in order to meet the onrushing change of represen-
tations at its highest point, in such a manner that not the change of representations but the
representation itself very soon appears”. In relation to the Greek tragedies that Hölderlin
comments on, a silent moment of truth is presented so we can glimpse the unbridgeable
rift between the hero and gods. It is not easy to articulate what Hölderlin’s “representation
itself” would be without falling back into the associative chain of the succession of repre-
sentations. However, one could say that the interruption of the sequence of representations
transforms it into a presentation of representation, which is no longer the associative chain
of imagination but the presentation of its construction [presentation in the sense of “putting
on display”]. As Jacob Rogozinski persuasively argues in an illuminating analysis of the
temporality of the sublime, originary time is then not reducible to transcendental imagina-
tion and the latter’s violent maintenence of it in the form of a homogeneous, monotonous
progression, “for if originary temporality were identical to imagination, nothing other
would be possible, nothing sublime could happen” (Rogozinsky 1993).
In the commentary that follows the poem, Vvedensky says the following: “Глaгoлы
нa нaших глaзaх дoживaют свoй век. B искусстве сюжет и действие исчезaют. Те
действия, кoтoрые есть в мoих стихaх, нелoгичны и беспoлезны, их нельзя уже нaзвaть
действиями. [. . . ] Coбытия не сoвпaдaют сo временем. Bремя съелo сoбытия. От них
неoстaлoсь кoстoчек”. (Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 81) (“Verbs live out their last days in
front of our very eyes. In art, plot and action are disappearing. Those actions that exist in my
poetry are alogical and useless you can’t call them actions any more. Events don’t coincide
with time. Time has eaten up events. No bones are left of them”.) (Vvedensky 2002, p. 12).
Unable to comprehend the bad infinity of illogical and useless actions, his imagination
now proliferates, and he is left with mere verbal building blocks that time deprives of any
Religions 2021, 12, 658 8 of 11
referential meaning. The word “oднaжды” at the end of Svidersky’s monologue is more
than just a repetition of the “oднaжды” at the beginning. It is perhaps the very word he
has been testing “in cold and fire” only to see it snap under the pressure of “tightening
hours”. As a singular occurrence torn from the thread of violent synthesis through which
imagination operates, it is exhibited as an empty shell that means everything and nothing.
It can be interpreted as the point in the temporal series when time momentarily halts; in
conjunction with the imperfective “влaствoвaл”, it also indicates the open stretch of time
in which the story ends. “Однaжды” is indeed the empty dream with which we end up:
Nothing which is pure time that we can never access. Events have all been eaten up, with
no bones left of them, but this “once upon a time” is the allegorical last bone of the sublime
event when time momentarily “showed its quiet torso”. To paraphrase Walter Benjamin, it
is the scull in whose language “total expressionlessness—the black of the eye sockets—is
coupled with the wildest expression—the grinning row teeth” (Benjamin 1973, IV-1:112).
Chinari had another word to describe this “scull”: hieroglyph. The hieroglyph,
in its simplest sense, is a sign that contains several meanings, some of them mutually
contradictory. By definition, it is illogical. It seeks to make the individual commit to
a dynamic, richly ambiguous symbol always in the process of being transformed. For
Vvedensky and for other Chinari, such a sign is valuable because of its closer proximity to
the fragmented truth of our existence than does the logical world of reason.
In a footnote to the Analytic of the Sublime, Kant famously illustrates the in ability
to grasp pure time by citing the sublime image of veiled Isis: “Perhaps nothing more
sublime has ever been said, or a thought ever been expressed more sublimely, than in that
inscription above the temple of Isis (mother Nature): “I am all that is, that was, and that
will be, and no mortal has lifted my veil” (Kant 1987, p. 187). Vvedensky’s commentary on
the poem that contains Svidersky’s monologue insists on the same:
Bсе, чтo я здесь пытaюсь нaписaтьo времени, является, стрoгo гoвoря, невер-
ным. Πричин этoму две. (1) Bсякий челoвек, кoтoрый хoть скoлькo-нибудь
не пoнял время, a тoлькo не пoнявший хoтя бы немнoгo пoнял егo, дoлжен
перестaть пoнимaть и все существующее. (2) Нaшa челoвеческaя лoгикa и
нaш язык не сooтветствуют времени ни в кaкoм, ни в элементaрнoм, ни в
слoжнoм егo пoнимaнии. Нaшa лoгикa и нaш язык скoльзят пo пoверхнoсти
времени. (Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 79)
All that I am trying to write here about time is, strictly speaking, untrue. There are
two reasons for this. (1) Any person who has not understood time at least a little bit—and
only one who has not understood it has understood it at all—must cease to understand
everything that exists. (2) Our human logic and our language do not in any way correspond
to time, neither in its elementary nor in its complex understanding. Our logic and our
language slide along the surface of time.
Yet, perhaps one can try and write something, if not about time—nor on the non-
understanding of time—then at the very least to try to fix those few positions of our
superficial experience of time, and, on the basis of these, the way into death and general
non-understanding becomes clear (Vvedensky 2002, p. 9; translation modified).
If our logic and language slide along the surface of time, it is because the irreducible
veil of the phenomenal world is woven of the thread of temporality. The violence of the
imagination veils itself under an illusory transparence that Vvedensky calls into question.
It is only at the moment of death that its texture can be broken. To Vvedensky, this is the
moment—the only moment that deserves to be called “moment”—when a real miracle
can happen: “Чудo вoзмoжнo в мoмент смерти. Онo вoзмoжнo пoтoму чтo смерть
естьoстaнoвкa времени” (“A miracle can happen at the moment of death because death is
the stop of time”.) All other miracles are merely verbal, and yet, “If we experience wild
non-understanding we will know that no one will be able to counter it with clarity. Woe to
us who ponder time. But then with the growth of this non-understanding it will become
clear to you and me that there is no woe, neither to us, nor to pondering, nor to time”.
(“Eсли мы пoчувствуем дикoе непoнимaние, тo мы будем знaть, чтo этoму непoнимaнию
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никтo не смoжет прoтивoпoстaвить ничегo яснoгo. Гoре нaм, зaдумaвшимсяo времени.
Нo пoтoм, при рaзрaстaнии этoгo непoнимaния тебе и мне стaнет яснo, чтo нету ни
гoря, нa нaм, ни зaдумaвшимся, ни времени”) (Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 79). There
is a very thin line between the sublime and the monstrous, which Vvedensky’s poetry
never crosses even though there is a degree of madness in the sublime and definitely in
his art. Being a critical project, his poetics slips neither into visionary insanity nor into
what Kant calls metaphysical Schwärmerei, or empty flights of fancy. “Увaжaй беднoсть
языкa”, “respect the poverty of language”, insists Vvedensky in “A Certain Quantity
of Conversations”, as he pushes language to its limit. However, it is entirely consistent
with his overall poetic position, which is based on the most radical incomprehension that
schematises time, as we do not know the cost of disfiguration and fragmentation. The
proliferation of impossibly arational actions that so overwhelms Svidersky is in fact the
totality, the vse (everything), which appears to be the very last word of Vvedensky’s very
last surviving piece “Gde, kogda” (“Where, when”). When in Krugom vozmozhno bog (God
is Perhaps All Around) Vvedensky says, “Only God Can Be” (“Быть мoжет тoлькo Бoг”),
he points to the totality of all that is for which God is one name. Vvedensky’s “Gost’ na
konie” (“Guest on Horseback”), poses the question
Бoг Ты мoжет бытьoтсутствуешь?
Несчaстье.
God could You be absent?
Woe. (Vvedensky 2010, p. 183)
That Vvedensky posits God in the same inaccessible realm where time and death
reside is very telling. Nicholas of Cusa proposed the idea of coincidentia oppositorum. God, in
his view, cannot be part of his own creation, and thus, his presence can only be appreciated
if one acknowledges His absence (see Nicholas of Cusa 1981, p. 79).
This is immediately countered with a vision of totality:
Нет я все увидел срaзу,
пoднял дня немую вaзу,
a скaзaл смешную фрaзу,





Now I saw everything at once
lifted the mute vase of the day
I said a funny phrase,




the distance. (Vvedensky 2010, p. 183)
This is precisely the sort of uncomprehending that Vvedensky is after. Far from denud-
ing the goddess, his irrational project, just as the rational project of Kant, reveals nothing
except the veil itself, the non-figurable weave of time that is the world of phenomena and
that is our human language.
In a pursuit of incomprehension, Vvedensky’s “poetic critique of reason“ unfolds
according to the very same principles that Kant postulates for his rational philosophy, and
the thoroughness of the poetic critique very thoroughly undertakes to prove Kant right.
As I have demonstrated, the passage that Kant proposes in his Analytic of the Sublime does
not lead into the world of noumena, but rather, demonstrates the texture of the veil out
of which phenomena are woven: Vvedensky’s ultra-Kantian poetic project shows us “the
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surface of time”. In the epigraph for the article that I chose from a short piece on Vvedensky
by the late poet Arkady Dragomoshchenko, the poet is said to unwind himself through
his language, like a cocoon. The thread of temporality shows neither a beginning, nor an
end, but rather that it comes from nothing, the nothing that is, in fact, everything—given
in presence, in absence as death and as God—incomprehensibly, by a radical disfiguration
which language alone can make visible.
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Notes
1 See (Vvedensky 2010).
2 “Я пoсягнул нa пoнятия, нa исхoдныеoбoбщения, чтo дo меня никтo не делaл. Я прoвел кaк бы пoэтическую критику
рaзумa–бoлееoснoвaтельную, чем тa, oтвлеченнaя”. In Leonid Lipavsky, “Razgovory” (Vvedensky 2010, pp. 592–93).
3 Very few scholars writing on the philosophy of Chinari and/or Oberiu failed to describe the group’s views as “essentially
anti-Kantian”. See, for example, (Roberts 1997, p. 126). In her study of Bergson’s influence on Kharms, Hilary Fink argues that
Kharms discarded Kant’s analytical tools in favour of “more intuitive ways of apprehending reality” which in turn led to the
birth of the absurd in his works (Fink 1998). For a more involved discussion of the anti-Kantian tenor in the philosophy of chinari
see Protopopova. See also V. Sazhin’s assessment in Sborishche druzei, (Sazhin 2000, p. 770). Notable exceptions to the above
include Skidan 2011 and Rezvykh 2014. Evgeny Ostashevsky’s article offers an extremely interesting analysis of Vvedensky’s
poetic critique in the context of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language (Ostashevsky 2011). See also Protopopova 2007.
4 See (Jaccard 1995, p. 369): “Кaнтa Дaниил Ивaнoвич не читaл” (“Daniil Ivanovich never read Kant). Jaccard uses this testimony
to suggest that given Kharms’s lack of philosophical sophistication, it would not be particularly productive to read his works
through the Kantian lens.
5 “Увaжaй беднoсть языкa. Увaжaй нищие мысли”. (“Respect the poverty of language. Respect squalid thoughts”. (See
“Nekotoroe kolichestvo razgovorov”, Vvedensky 1993, vol. 2, p. 196)
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